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This paper is a comparative analysis of two key documentaries by Fernando 
Solanas: La hora de los hornos / The Hour of the Furnaces (1966–68) and 
Memoria del saqueo / Social Genocide (2003). It argues that Solanas 
produces documentaries when the representative link that ties the political 
representatives to the represented (the people) is suspended or breaks 
down, as experienced during the times of the proscription of Peronism 
(1955–73) and in the more recent crisis of representation in Argentine 
institutional politics (1989–2001). The comparison follows two axes: political 
arguments and the aesthetics of contrast. Regarding the ﬁ rst criterion, the 
paper highlights the current persistence, in Solanas’s political argumenta-
tion, of externalist-mechanistic versions of dependency theory of the late 
1960s and early 1970s. In relation to the aesthetics of contrast, it analyses 
the stark oppositions in Solanas’s documentaries as a visual rhetoric 
which can be read as an essentialist false-bottom economy that opposes 
‘appearance’ to ‘reality’. The article concludes that these political and aes-
thetic polarizations are essentializing and literalizing discursive strategies 
that denounce the excesses of political representation from an unmediated 
and transparent site of full popular presence. Within such strategies, there 
is no room for the constitutive opacity intrinsic to representation and 
articulatory politics.
Lines of continuity can be established in the political argumentation and aesthetics of 
the documentary production of Fernando Solanas, arguably the best-known Argen-
tine fi lmmaker, from his seminal documentary production La hora de los hornos to 
his recent return to the genre after a break of nearly forty years of fi ction fi lm produc-
tion. Memoria del saqueo (2003) is the fi rst of a series of fi ve documentaries that he 
has been producing on the on-going economic and social crisis in Argentina since the 
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end of 2001 (Vieira & Olivera, forthcoming).1 His documentaries thus emerge when 
the representative bond that ties political representatives to the represented people 
breaks down in two critical moments for representative democracy in contemporary 
Argentine history.
The revolutionary politics during the dictatorships that ruled the country intermit-
tently between 1955 and 1973, the proscription of Peronism and Peron’s exile (1955–
73) provide the historical canvas for La hora de los hornos. In fact, the founding scene 
of popular democracy in Argentina documented was the Day of Peronist Loyalty (17 
October 1945) when Perón was liberated from prison by the action of the crowds. 
This event frames the second part of the fi lm, Acto de liberación / Liberation Act, in 
terms of democratic presence. In a way, it anticipates another founding moment of 
popular-democratic spontaneity which took place a year after La hora de los hornos 
was released, the Cordobazo (29 May 1969). In turn, the betrayal of the representative 
bond in democratic times, after the long and severe crisis of representation of the 
1990s, according to Memoria del saqueo, started with Alfonsín in 1983 but became 
evident during the Menem period (1989–99) and De la Rúa’s government (1999–2001). 
In this second critical moment, Argentina fi nds its scene of democratic presence in 
the popular spontaneous rebellions of 19 and 20 December 2001 (also referred to in 
Solanas’s documentary as the pueblada or patriada). These events frame Memoria del 
saqueo: they constitute the starting point (opening sequence) and the culmination 
point (fi nal chapter) of the fi lm.
1 The question of representation, populism and political subjects
The ‘nation-people’ is the key political subject in Solanas’s documentaries. Whereas 
in La hora, the pueblo is the Peronist proletariat, in Memoria del saqueo, there is a 
more inclusive concept of the people, embracing the middle classes, but it is still 
named ‘pueblo’, ‘pueblada’ or ‘patriada’ (unemployed workers, pensioners, students, 
housewives, artists, shopkeepers, women farmers). However, in both versions of 
pueblo, the real substance of democracy is external to (institutional) politics (‘the 
system’) and previous to representation (literalization). This relationship of simple, 
immediate expression, without a symbolic, representative mediation, is clear in 
La hora de los hornos. At the beginning of its second part, the voice-over says: ‘El 
pueblo [. . .] el 17 de octubre hace nacer a Perón. Perón surge como la expresión 
nacional de un pueblo dispuesto a alcanzar su defi nitiva independencia’, after which 
it shows footage of Evita affi rming ‘Nosotros somos el pueblo. Somos la patria’. 
Similarly, Solanas introduces Memoria del saqueo showing images of the mobiliza-
tions of 19 and 20 December 2001, while commenting: ‘Era la patriada espontánea de 
los nadies que ocupaba la ciudad de las instituciones y los bancos’, and drawing an 
explicit parallel with the people’s unmediated previous presence on 17 October 1945 
(the National Day of Peronist Loyalty) and in the Cordobazo of May 1969. It is thus 
1 The other four documentaries of the series are: La dignidad de los nadies / The Dignity of the Nobodies 
(2005), Argentina latente / Latent Argentina (in production), a fourth one on ‘the technological, industrial and 
scientifi c reconstruction of Argentina, and a fi fth one on the wealth of the land and the disputes over its 
ownership’ (Solanas, cited in Vieira & Olivera, forthcoming).
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clear that, for Solanas, Peronism represented the people making their presence 
transparent, whereas Menemism broke this transparency through an excessive effect 
on the representative pole: the betrayal of the representative bond.
In populism, there is always a tension between two poles — the representative 
and the represented — and none of them can be reduced or completely erased. 
Neither was it the case that Peronism transparently expressed the presence of the 
represented people, nor is it the case that Menemism can be reduced to a complete 
autonomization of the representative pole with no link with the represented. As 
Laclau points out (2005: 158), there is always a tension in every relation of political 
representation, a double movement from the representative to the represented and 
from the represented to the representative:
It is in the nature of representation that the representative is not merely a passive agent, 
but has to add something to the interest he represents. This addition, in turn, is refl ected 
in the identity of those represented, which changes as a result of the very process of rep-
resentation. Thus, representation is a two-way process: a movement from represented to 
representative, and a correlative one from representative to represented. The represented 
depends on the representative for the constitution of his or her own identity.
Following this line of argumentation about the centrality of the process of political 
representation in the construction of populism, he concludes:
If representation illuminates something of the inner structure of populism, however, we 
could say that, conversely, populism throws some light on something that belongs to 
the essence of representation. [. . .] Constructing a ‘people’ is not simply the application 
to a particular case of a general theory of representation; it is, on the contrary, a 
paradigmatic case, because it is the one which reveals representation for what it is: the 
primary terrain of constitution of social objectivity. (Laclau 2005: 163)
Given the constitutional gap between representatives and represented, and the 
loosening of the representative term vis-à-vis the represented one during critical 
junctures, whenever there is a crisis of political representation, the system makes 
visible the constitutive fi ctionality on which every relation of political representation 
is based, and which is intrinsic to politics as such (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 140). In 
fact, in every representative function or link there is always an element of fi ctionality; 
representation is always a fi ctio iuris insofar as — as Laclau & Mouffe point out 
— it is a form of presence which operates through metaphoric transposition between 
two elements, the represented and the representative (that which fulfi ls the function 
of representing). Political representation is never transparent, as Solanas’s documen-
taries seem to suggest in relation to the ‘spontaneous presence’ of the people in 1945, 
1969, and 2001. Every process of representation takes the form of a tension in an 
‘unstable fi eld of oscillation’ between two poles: ‘the literalization of fi ction through 
the break of all link between representative and represented’, and the cancellation of 
all separation between them by means of the absortion of their respective identities 
as moments of a single identity (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 140). Far from being the 
spontaneous and transparent expression of the people, as Laclau (2005: 163) says, 
‘any popular identity has an inner structure which is essentially representative [. . .] 
for the construction of the “people” would be impossible without the operation of 
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mechanisms of representation’. The representative term doesn’t merely express the 
represented, it constitutes it as an identity. But Solanas denounces the suspension of 
this representational link as external to democratic politics, as a betrayal of the 
representatives (the political class) vis-à-vis a pre-given social-real, as an excess of 
representation over the real, of (institutional) politics over the social. It is in 
this ‘politics of anti-politics’ (Panizza 2000: 180) — which corresponds to the fi rst 
discursive feature of populism (see below) — that Solanas’s populist strategy lies.
Solanas seeks to intervene in this very hiatus between an excess in the pole of 
representation (the fi ctional dimension of politics exemplifi ed by betrayal) and the 
transparency of the full presence of the people as the real substance of democracy.2 
This is exactly the rhetorical site where populist discourse operates. Both La hora de 
los hornos and Memoria del saqueo perform two discursive operations (see below) 
which are characteristic of populist discourse: a) a denunciation of (institutional) 
politics; b) an affi rmation of the unmediated presence of the ‘social-real’ (the 
people).
The long-standing tradition of political discourse analysis in Argentina, associated 
with De Ipola, Laclau, Panizza, Sigal and Verón has identifi ed, with remarkable 
rigour, the enunciative regularities that mark what is specifi cally populist about a 
discourse — starting from corpora mainly consisting of Peronist speeches and texts. 
Two discursive strategies seem to be the core operations of populist discourse.
De Ipola (1983) and Sigal & Verón (1986) have identifi ed the feature of distancing 
vis-à-vis ‘politics’ (political society, the State, or power bloc) as characteristic of 
populist discourse. This corresponds to Laclau’s anti-elitism (1998a) and to the anti-
institutionalism which identify the elites with institutionalized politics. This discur-
sive operation entails a symbolic division of the social space into two opposed camps: 
the underdogs (the people or the civil society) and the top dogs (the people’s Other: 
the political class). This dichotomy also structures the main social antagonism in 
terms of political society versus civil society, identifying the latter with the pueblo 
(Panizza 2000b: 180). A second core operation of populist discourse relates to a 
privileged hermeneutic position vis-à-vis the ‘social-real’, guaranteed by strategies 
of transparency and by procedures for the production of social ‘evidence’: the reality 
of the social is affi rmed over the fi ction of politics (De Ipola 1983: 125–26). As a 
discursive strategy, it seeks the symbolic unity of the people through the construction 
of a ‘chain of equivalences’ (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 147–54). The discursive strategies 
— present both in La hora de los hornos and Memoria del saqueo — of presenting 
statistical representations and of showing the human side of sufferings and demands 
through individual ‘cases’ — can be considered from this perspective. Both are 
discursive processes of producing ‘the people’ as reality, as either objective evidence 
or crude subjective pathos, respectively. Complementing these fi ndings with an 
analytical study of Argentine TV discourse in the 1990s (Olivera 1997), I have 
tried to systematize the discursive regularities that defi ne populism as a singular 
enunciative confi guration, able to be articulated in various, and often divergent, 
2 And more concretely, in two major ‘historical hiatuses’ in Argentina, that is to say, in the two historical 
moments mentioned above in which this hiatus became most visible: a) the proscription of Peronism during 
authoritarian rule and semi-democracy (1955–73); b) Menemism and the crisis of political representation 
(1989–2001).
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concrete discourses. A crucial fi nding was that this confi guration distributes subject 
positions around the spatial oppositions of interiority-exteriority. With the produc-
tion of an ‘outside of power’ or exteriority from politics, populist discourse constructs 
its specifi c antagonism to the state, public fi gures and the power bloc. On the other 
hand, populist discourse creates a space of full presence which would allow the 
people’s voice — and thus the ‘popular-democratic interpellations’ (Laclau 1977) — 
to be heard, without mediations. By means of this spatial confi guration, populist 
discourse aims to produce transparency effects: the populist operation would thus 
consist of restoring the popular, the spontaneously democratic. In populist discourse, 
the social body of the people is essentially non-political, and, paradoxically, can 
only become a political force if it enters an anti-political threshold by expressing its 
social antagonism against (institutional) politics as a deceitful and corrupt sphere of 
society.
2 Two comparisons between La hora de los hornos and Memoria 
del saqueo
Having discussed representation and identifi ed some populist discursive markers in 
La hora and Memoria del saqueo, I will now draw a comparison between the two 
documentaries in terms of their respective political arguments and their aesthetics of 
contrast.
2.1 Political arguments: the persistence of externalist dependency 
theory
One recurrent argumentative feature of both fi lms is the explanation of Argentine 
grievances through a continuous plundering, throughout history, from Spanish 
colonialism and nineteenth-century imperialism, to 1960s neo-colonialism and current 
globalization. This argument is characteristic of the externalist and mechanistic 
versions of dependency theory (Blomström & Hettne 1984), notably the model 
metropolis/satellites put forward by André Gunder Frank (1971, 1972, 1978). There 
are certainly other models of dependency theory that are more complex and subtle. 
For example, those dynamic models which emphasize the complex internal confi gura-
tion of dependency situations: they are structuralist rather than mechanistic, and they 
highlight a signifying logic in dependency rather than a causal-deterministic one (from 
the metropolis to the satellites). Key works of important fi gures such as Dos Santos 
(1973) and Cardoso & Faletto (1998) are good examples of these dynamic models.3
But externalist and mechanistic dependency theory was the argumentative model 
that predominated in La hora de los hornos and in Argentine Third Cinema in 
general. Third Cinema, the project put forward by Fernando Solanas and Octavio 
Getino in the late 1960s and early 1970s and disseminated in the crucial manifesto 
‘Towards a Third Cinema’ (1969), was conceived as a politically committed cinema 
3 For a general discussion of the different models and approaches in dependency theory (external vs internal, 
dynamic vs mechanistic), see Blomström & Hettne 1984; for situating Frank and his externalist-mechanistic 
model within dependency theory and in relation to modernization theory, see Leaver 1977 and Foster-Carter 
1976; for a recent updated appraisal of dependency theory, see Dos Santos 2003.
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which, for the Third World, was the only alternative to First and Second Cinema 
(Hollywood and European, auteur cinema, respectively). It was a seminal piece 
for the emergence of the New Latin American Cinema.4 I now wish to argue that 
Memoria del saqueo is an updating of this mechanistic-externalist model of argumen-
tation, globalization being an exacerbated phase of previous imperialism. In La hora 
de los hornos, dependency theory can be summarized under three main arguments, 
which can also be recognized to some degree in Memoria del saqueo:
1.  The impossible and contradictory character of the relationship between depen-
dency and development. As stated in section 9 of La hora (La dependencia/ 
Dependency), Part I (Neocolonialismo y violencia / Neo-colonialism and 
Violence):
En la dependencia no hay ninguna forma posible de desarrollo. El aparente 
desarrollo de algunas ciudades-puerto traduce sólo la creciente expansión de las 
grandes potencias en el seno de nuestras economías.
 Hence, the structure of dependency necessarily determines development in 
the metropolitan centres and underdevelopment in the peripheral satellites; as 
a consequence of this, there is a simple alignment between imperialism/
development, on the one hand, and dependency/underdevelopment, on the 
other hand; this argument makes Solanas’s documentaries similar to Frank’s 
classical formulation of dependency: the ‘development of underdevelopment’:
This colonial and class structure establishes very well defi ned class interests for the 
dominant sector of the [Latin American] bourgeoisie. Using government cabinets and 
other instruments of the State, the bourgeoisie produces a policy of underdevelop-
ment in the economic, social and political life of the ‘nation’ and the people of 
Latin America. When a change in the forms of dependence modifi es the economic 
and class structure, this in turn generates changes in the policy of the dominant 
class which further strengthen the very same bonds of economic dependence 
which produced the policy and thus aggravate still further the development of 
underdevelopment in Latin America. (Frank 13; my italics)
2.  The heuristic level that explains the evidence of the division between ‘develop-
ment’ and ‘underdevelopment’ is an abstract entity: the System, understood 
essentially as the world market which defi nes capitalism in Latin America in 
the phase of circulation rather than at the level of production (mode of produc-
tion), as pointed out by Laclau (1971). Consequently, both fi lms produce a 
two-way correspondence between the System (the imperialist/global market) 
and development, and the dependency ties are depicted as a simple saqueo 
colonial, which is constant and self-identical throughout history.
3.  The internal dynamic confi guration of the peripheral countries is reduced to 
pure political instrumentality as in functional explanatory logic (Hempel 1965; 
Giddens 1979: 7, 111–13; Tomlinson 1991: 38, 104, 175). This is the thesis of the 
‘internal factors of power’ as mere parasites or appendices of the metropolis 
4 See Solanas & Getino 1973; for an English translation, see Chanan 1983; for debates about Third Cinema, see 
Shohat & Stam 1996; for an updating of the Third Cinema project in a globalized world, see Chanan 1997. 
253FERNANDO SOLANAS
in satellite territories.5 First imperialism, and later globalization, mechanically 
determine — from an external site — dependency in Third World countries. 
For example, in Memoria del saqueo, Solanas’s voice-over states: ‘El presu-
puesto se aprobaba en Washington antes que en Buenos Aires’. Within this line 
of argument, the internal dynamics of the domestic ruling classes are reduced 
to a moral behaviour: betrayal. For instance, in the fi rst section of La hora 
de los hornos, entitled La historia / History, the voice-over says: ‘La indepen-
dencia de los países latinoamericanos fue traicionada desde sus orígenes. La 
traición corrió por cuenta de las élites exportadoras de las ciudades puertos’; 
similarly, the second chapter of Memoria del saqueo is entitled ‘Chronicle of 
the betrayal’, and narrates the democratic period after 1983 as a sequence of 
betrayals of the representative in relation to the represented.
It is also interesting to note the striking argumentative similarity between section 
9 of La hora (La dependencia / Dependency) and section 5 of Memoria del saqueo 
(Las privatizaciones / The Privatizations): there are similar images and the same 
historical account that dates colonial plundering, and dependency on Europe and the 
US, back to the Spanish Conquest. Thus, section 9 of La hora opens with the tolling 
of a church bell, while there is a drawing of a typical scene of the Spanish Conquest 
with the following superimposed message: ‘Los que en aquella tierra viven dicen: en 
la tierra adentro hay unas tierras de donde sacan infi nitísimo oro. Sebastián Caboto, 
1544.’ Then, the voice-over is more than eloquent:
Lo que caracteriza a los países latinoamericanos es su dependencia: dependencia 
económica, dependencia política, dependencia cultural. Primero España, después Inglat-
erra, hoy Estados Unidos, la historia de nuestros países es la historia de un interminable 
saqueo colonial. Sin independencia económica no hay independencia política. José Martí 
decía: ‘el pueblo que quiera ser libre que lo sea primero en negocios’. En la dependencia 
no hay ninguna forma posible de desarrollo. El aparente desarrollo de algunas ciudades-
puerto traduce sólo la creciente expansión de las grandes potencias en el seno de nuestras 
economías. Ayer Mitre, Pellegrini, Pinedo. Hoy Prebisch, Frigerio, Alzogaray. Préstamos, 
inversiones, empréstitos, sirvieron siempre a una misma política de sometimiento. La 
presunta ayuda imperialista es una ayuda que siempre cuesta más al que la recibe que al 
que la da. Por cada dólar invertido en América Latina el imperialismo se lleva cuatro. 
Oro y café, carne y petróleo, trigo y estaño, el trabajo de un pueblo convertido en mano 
de obra barata construyeron las riquezas de las grandes potencias. Es esta explotación 
la causa del atraso, la miseria, la opresión, la que posibilita el funcionamiento y el alto 
nivel de vida de las naciones desarrolladas, la que hizo nacer esa oscura palabra 
inventada por el imperialismo: subdesarrollo. (La hora de los hornos, Part I, Section 9: 
La dependencia)
An almost identical contrapuntal audiovisual opening in section 5 of Memoria del 
saqueo (Las privatizaciones / The Privatizations) precedes and frames a very similar 
political argument about the continuity of self-identical dependency ties. Here again, 
5 According to Blomström & Hettne (1984: 72), ‘the concept of “satellite” suggests a total lack of a dynamics of 
its own’.
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a church bell tolls, while a drawing shows Spanish conquistadores arriving in Latin 
American lands and meeting some Indians. To which Solanas’s voice-over adds:
Más allá de los siglos y los métodos, las concesiones de los bienes del Estado serán 
continuidad de las viejas explotaciones coloniales. Antes fue el oro y la plata de Potosí. 
Hoy, las ganancias del petróleo, el agua y las comunicaciones. Las compañías extranjeras 
hicieron en nuestro país lo que no les hubieran permitido hacer en los suyos. (Memoria 
del saqueo, Chapter 5)
In short, we can say that in the externalist-mechanistic version of dependency offered 
by La hora and Memoria del saqueo, there is a predominance of the causal and 
systemic moment over the signifying and historical one: by attributing the explana-
tory principle totally and deterministically to the external causes (imperialism/
globali zation as the explanandum), the historical singularity of the internal dynamics 
as an articulatory moment between the internal and the external is lost. Ultimately, 
this operation of attribution reduces and dissolves the internal dynamics into a pure-
ly instrumental factor (it sees the local elites as ‘internal factors of power’, merely 
parasitical on the economy and culture of the metropolis). It is precisely this pre-
dominance that explains that, in this version of dependency theory, the discursive 
moment of reversal is privileged over that of displacement.6 Thus, in these fi lms, 
imperialism, neo-colonialism and globalization are systems that mechanically deter-
mine, from an external site, dependency or the Third World situation understood 
as a set of positions and functions (metropolis/satellites; centre/periphery): this is 
what I call the functionalism or the functional explanatory logic (Hempel 1965, 
Giddens 1979: 7, 111–13, Tomlinson 1991: 38, 104, 175) implicit in externalist-
mechanistic dependency theory.
What is at stake here is a reversal of dominant discourses of modernization 
(neo-colonialism, neo-liberalism), through a mere substitution of explananda, while 
keeping the same functionalist explanatory logic. This substitution of explananda 
results from a shift in the operation of attribution from endogenous causes of 
underdevelopment (traditional cultural traits, backwardness, ineffi ciency, etc., typical 
of modernization theory) to exogenous causes (imperialism, globalization, and 
the world market; typical of externalist dependency theory). In short, there is a pre-
dominance of the discursive moment of reversal — with its dominant components: 
antagonism and equivalence — over the operations of displacement.
Solanas’s documentaries are certainly very effective in overturning the polarity of 
the dominant dichotomies and in reversing the hierarchal oppositions which underlie 
the various colonizing discourses, hegemonic in Argentina and Latin America through-
out history, by unequivocally uncovering ‘the confl ictual and subordinating structure’ 
(Derrida 1981: 41) of these dualisms (their privileged and marginal terms) and by 
exposing their inherent violence as not only dominant, but also highly oppressive 
systems of values. So, for example, the hierarchical opposition between development 
and underdevelopment is recast in terms of centre and periphery, resulting in a 
reversal of the privilege and values assigned to their respective terms. However, these 
fi lms do not seem to be able to move beyond this antagonistic overturning of the 
6 I follow Derrida’s (1981) conceptualizations of ‘reversal’ (‘inversion’ or ‘overturning’) and ‘displacement’ as the 
two necessary moments of deconstructing a text or a discourse.
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dominant binary oppositions towards a new conceptual system or a different 
rhetorical space. Solanas’s discourse seems to remain trapped within the binary logic 
at stake in the reversal operation it performs: there is simply no effective displacement 
or indeed conceptual resituating of this binary logic in another argumentative 
or tropological level. This is because, when exclusively operating antagonistic over-
turnings without a differential displacement into another rhetorical space, the logic 
of equivalence dominates so much over the logic of difference, that the resulting 
critical discourse merely reproduces the rhetorical operations and argumentative 
logic of the dominant discourse, albeit changing its axiology.7 This is to say that, as 
discussed above, the argumentative texture of these documentaries follows the very 
same functional explanatory pattern as those used by those discourses which they are 
attempting to denounce and contest (the theory of modernization and subsequent 
neo-liberal discourses). Through its use of this functional explanatory logic and its 
maintenance of binary oppositions such as centre/periphery (or representatives/
represented), Solanas’s documentary discourse, far from challenging dominant dis-
courses and producing new conceptual, argumentative and political strategies against 
global capitalism, represents a regression to the rhetorical operations characteristic 
of externalist-mechanistic dependency theory. Thus, any possibility of resituating 
the dominant binaries in a more complex and differential articulation of terms 
and elements — attentive to heterogeneity and singularity — in a more dynamic, 
decentred (and perhaps hybrid) conceptual and tropological space becomes discur-
sively impossible within the restrictive limits of Solanas’s antagonistic reversals: his 
‘politics of rhetoric’ (Laclau 1998b).
In short, the exclusive emphasis on the antagonistic movement of reversal reintro-
duces the equivalent dominant causal-mechanistic logic, thus aborting any possible 
displacement into a new conceptual system. The only elements of displacement that 
Solanas’s documentaries recognize in neo-colonial ideology and in the dependency 
situation are those of the mask, the disguise and later betrayal, but not as operations 
or confi gurations — as in Bhabha (1986) for example — but as simple instruments 
of ideological inversion in the service of the neo-colonial illusions and lies. So, for 
example, the dependency discourse of La hora is elaborated as a reversal of the by 
then dominant modernization discourse, a reversal which, avoiding any displacing 
operation of the neo-colonial antagonism, simply literalizes it. Summarizing, we 
can say that the denouncement of neo-colonialism and globalization by these 
documentaries literalizes Third World antagonisms.
2.2 The aesthetics of contrast: visual rhetoric as moral criticism
The fundamental discursive strategies of Solanas’s documentaries express the 
national-popular antagonism — because it is not always apparent as real opposition 
7 That is to say, the critical discourse is the reversed image of the discourse criticized, and in that sense it is 
equivalent to it: it is more similar than dissimilar. An overriding antagonistic reversal of this type tends to split 
the social fi eld in two paratactical camps (centre/periphery) resulting in a stark polarization between two 
opposed chains of equivalences (the world market or the ‘System’ vs the nation-people), leaving no room for 
the politicization of difference, that is to say, for other differential articulations and positions within this over-
simplifi ed political fi eld. For a discussion of the logics of equivalence and the logics of difference as the two 
main discursive logics at stake in relation to the construction of social antagonisms, see Laclau & Mouffe 1985, 
and Norvall 2000: 217–22.
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— in terms of fi lmic logical contradictions: stark, extreme visual and contrapuntal 
contrasts, morally organized in false-bottom economies. This rhetoric of the image 
consists of spatial and aesthetic oppositions. Montages juxtapose contrasting 
images or angles to show antagonisms as the system’s logical contradictions. Certain 
recurring oppositions which inhabit the aesthetics of both fi lms are:
1. faces of deprived children / skyscrapers and tall city buildings;
2.  faces of deprived children / empty government offi ces and institutional 
buildings;
3. poor / rich;
4. high angle / low angle;
5. countryside / city [Buenos Aires]
6.  contrapuntal sound: contrast sound/images with ironic, parodic, or sarcastic 
effects.
These contrasts and contradictions respond to what I call a ‘false-bottom economy’ 
(‘economía de doble fondo’) centred on the structuring opposition appearance/reality 
or appearance/essence. In La hora de los hornos this false-bottom economy appears 
within a rhetoric that denounces disguises and masks: the phrase ‘La monstruosidad 
se viste de belleza’ eloquently synthesizes this revealing, unmasking discursive opera-
tion in Section 12 (La guerra ideológica), in Part I of the fi lm. In Memoria del saqueo, 
the false-bottom economy can be read in the iconic juxtaposition of ‘la ciudad de las 
instituciones y de los bancos’ and ‘los nadies’ in the Introduction to the documentary. 
It can also be recognized in the contrapuntal montage shown in Chapter 4 (El 
modelo económico), which juxtaposes, on the one hand, the words of Neustadt — the 
offi cial journalist of Menemism — describing in his TV programme the benefi ts 
of the economic model for the country and denying the impoverishing effects of the 
neo-liberal model (‘Es mentira que este modelo produce pobres’), and, on the other 
hand, the heartbreaking images of paupers living in a fl ooded area. There is a strong 
moral content derived from the very form of these oppositions — their very false-
bottom structure — which are used to denounce deception through mask and 
disguises [La hora . . .] or through betrayals and lies [Memoria del saqueo].
Another striking similarity in this rhetoric of contrast, characteristic of both fi lms, 
is that between the beginning of Chapter 4 (La ciudad puerto), in Part I of La hora, 
and the opening images of Memoria del saqueo. The passage from Chapter 3 to 
Chapter 4 in La hora is achieved by means of a montage. A fi lmic quotation of 
Fernando Birri’s famous scene in his seminal documentary Tire dié/ Throw us a dime 
(1956) — in which street children are begging money from the passengers of a passing 
train in the province of Santa Fe (Argentina) — alternates with high angle shots and 
low angle shots of city buildings in Buenos Aires. At the end of this contrasting 
sequence, Solanas edits Birri’s image of the last child looking up at the train from a 
high angle with a low angle shot of a tall Buenos Aires building, suggesting an iden-
tifi cation of his own gaze with that of the subjective camera. This is a paradigmatic 
montage of internal colonialism within neo-colonialism/imperialism and highlights 
the system’s contradiction between deprived begging children and metropolitan 
wealth in terms of camera angles (high/low) with their respective diminishing and 
magnifying visual effects. Exactly the same visual rhetoric occurs in the opening 
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sequence of Memoria del saqueo; its very fi rst image is a superimposition of two 
shots: a low angle shot of tall and wealthy city buildings and a close-up shot of 
a deprived child’s face. This suggests that globalization renders the imperialist con-
tradictions simultaneous, timeless: the two sides of the same coin (signifi er/signifi ed; 
representative/represented). This opening superimposition is a synthetic image of glo-
balization and highly symbolic of the overall message of the fi lm. The same rhetoric 
of contrast between low angle shots of tall city buildings and high angle shots of 
deprived children scavenging garbage becomes a syntagmatic montage — this time by 
means of juxtaposition rather than superimposition — throughout the Introduction 
to Memoria.
How can we make sense of these extreme aesthetic contrasts? To what extent 
do they constitute a politically meaningful visual rhetoric? How can we read them 
politically? According to Laclau & Mouffe (1985) and Laclau (1988), social antago-
nisms can only be shown, but never said, because they are located at the limits of 
language. They can only manifest themselves as metaphors according to the totalizing 
logic of condensations and symbols.8 The fundamental and structuring antagonism 
displayed by Solanas’s documentaries is that of ‘the nation-people’ vs ‘the System’. 
Following Laclau’s ideas, the unity and integrity of the national-popular identity is 
neither essential nor literal, but symbolic and metaphorical, and its meaning is 
fundamentally negative: anti-imperialist (Third World), antibourgeois/ antioligarchic 
(popular) and anti-European (Latin American).
But how does La hora construct its antagonistic enemy, the System? First, it gives 
it a proper name: ‘neo-colonialism’. Neo-colonialism is a displaced continuation 
of its predecessor: colonialism. This displacement does not express the antagonism of 
the colonial tie as a real opposition between two forces (as the different modes of 
coercion which are characteristic of colonial domination would do: sacking, serfdom, 
genocides and wars), but disguises such antagonism. The specifi c form that antago-
nism takes in neo-colonial domination is precisely that of the mask and that of the 
disguise. In Memoria, this displaced antagonism takes another moral form: betrayal. 
(Betrayal is one of the key explanatory categories used throughout the fi lm, and its 
Chapter 2 is eloquently entitled Crónica de la traición.) Therefore, the fundamental 
discursive strategy of Solanas’s documentaries is to express this antagonism, which is 
not apparent as real opposition, in terms of logical contradiction. This discursive 
procedure follows the previously mentioned false-bottom structure that opposes 
surface to depth, according to what I would like to call two regimes:
1)  a set of superfi cial metaphorical operations that construct an identity out of 
the condensation of symbols put together in a false mask: ‘Universality’ and 
‘Man’ are neo-colonial masks that hide the ethnocentrism and neo-racism of a 
dominant particularity: the European/North American white man (see La hora, 
Part I, Chapter 11: Los modelos / The Models);9
8 Drawing on the Wittgensteinian distinction between ‘saying’ and ‘showing’, Laclau states that social antago-
nism ‘can only exist as a disruption of language, as metaphor. Antagonism is the limit of the social, the witness 
of the ultimate impossibility of society, the moment in which the sense of precariousness reaches its highest 
level’ (Laclau 1988: 256).
9 ‘Se impondrá el modelo de hombre universal, valor universal, cultura universal, es decir, la desintegración de 
los valores, de la cultura y del hombre’ (La hora, Part I, Chapter 11: Los modelos / The Models).
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2)  at a deeper, ‘real’, level, a metonymic regime which operates by penetration 
and contagion (corruption), and expresses the real hegemonic displacement of 
neo-colonialism and globalization: winning adept consciousnesses through its 
victory in the ‘ideological and cultural war’.
This is Solanas’s diagnosis of neo-colonial, and later global, domination. Its strategy 
of counter-hegemonic resistance consists of counter-metaphorical — and as 
such, literalizing — operations that reverse these dominant metaphoric operations, 
denouncing them as false. Thus, for example, La hora makes visible the contingency 
of the dominant neo-colonial metaphoric totalizations (‘Man’ in capital letters is 
actually ‘the European white man’; Chapter 11, Part I), and then proposes its own 
totalizations around the identity of the ‘nation-people’. However, these are not pre-
sented as contingent, but as essential and literal identities: authentic identity spaces 
of full humanity — paradigmatically expressed in close-ups of deprived children’s 
faces both in La hora and in Memoria — external to the neo-colonial and global 
System. The ‘nation-people’ in these documentaries is, therefore, a literalization. That 
is why it can only propose either war and militarization (La hora) or spontaneous 
popular mobilization (Memoria) as the necessary forms of struggle against neo-
colonialism, globalization and ‘Mafi a power’, producing a literalization of the 
national-popular antagonism, that is, its direct translation into a specifi c objective 
relation: the real opposition between popular and repressive forces. This, in Memo-
ria, is directly translated into a moral opposition: the dignity of the represented vs 
the betrayal of the representative.
3 Final remarks: the strategy of denouncing representation as 
excess
Solanas’s denunciation and reversal of these false-bottom economies is his strategy of 
resistance to the neo-colonial (in 1968) and neo-liberal (in 2003) totalizations of the 
world market, to which he opposes his own counter-hegemonic totalizations in the 
identity of the ‘nation-people’. But the contingent link between the nation-people 
and the universal values it represents (total liberation in La hora, human dignity in 
Memoria del saqueo, and so on) appears, in the documentaries considered, as a neces-
sary and transparent one (as ‘natural’ attributes of the nation-people), because their 
discursive operations tend to erase the traces of the contingency of the articulation 
between this specifi c historical agent and its more universal political and moral tasks. 
It is through these naturalizing and literalizing operations that the rhetoric of Solanas’s 
documentaries loses political effi cacy in the struggle for hegemony. Because, as Laclau 
says (1998b: 11–13), ‘if there is going to be hegemony, the traces of the contingency 
of the articulation cannot be entirely effaced. [. . .] It is only on the traces of (contingent) 
contiguity contaminating all analogy that a hegemonic relation can emerge’. The 
pueblo-nación of these documentaries is a literality, the transparent and unmediated 
revelation of a full presence that can only produce ‘concealing effects’.
Denouncing the excesses of deceitful representation, Solanas opts for the transpar-
ency of an unmediated full presence: the people shouting in indignity, at the end of 
Memoria del saqueo (Chapter 10), ‘Que se vayan todos’. He thus shows, at the same 
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time, the fullness of the social and the complete vacuum of representative politics. 
Memoria del saqueo ends with the empty corridors and stairwells of the Casa 
Rosada, the presidential building in Buenos Aires, overlooking an over-crowded 
Plaza de Mayo, the symbolic centre of Argentine democracy, where most of the 
popular demonstrations and protests take place. Meanwhile, the voices of the people 
affi rm their presence, in a contrapuntal soundtrack, singing ‘El pueblo no se va’ 
(Memoria del saqueo, Chapter 10). Between the presence of the social and the 
excesses of representation, between full transparency and empty mirages, in these 
documentaries there is no room for the opacity of representation and articulatory 
politics.10
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Este artículo es un análisis comparativo de dos documentales clave de Fernando 
Solanas: La hora de los hornos (1966–68) y Memoria del saqueo (2003). El trabajo 
argumenta que Solanas produce documentales cuando el lazo representativo 
que vincula los representantes políticos con los representados (el pueblo) se 
suspende o se rompe, como ocurrió durante la época de la proscripción del 
peronismo (1955–73) y en la más reciente crisis de representación de las institu-
ciones políticas argentinas (1989–2001). La comparación se basa en dos crite-
rios: argumentos políticos y estética de contrastes. Con respecto al primer 
criterio, el artículo subraya la persistencia actual, en la argumentación política de 
Solanas, de las versiones externalistas y mecanicistas de la teoría de la depen-
dencia de ﬁ nales de los años sesenta y principios de los setenta. En relación con 
la estética de contrastes, se analizan las rígidas oposiciones de los documen-
tales de Solanas como una retórica visual que puede ser leída como una economía 
de doble fondo que opone ‘apariencia’ a ‘realidad’. El artículo concluye que estas 
polarizaciones estéticas y políticas son estrategias discursivas esencializantes y 
literalizantes que denuncian los excesos de la representación política desde un 
lugar transparente y no mediado de presencia popular plena. Dentro de una 
estrategia semejante, no hay espacio alguno para la opacidad constitutiva de la 
representación y la articulación políticas.
